The value of power and the power of values: a call for an EU grand strategy. Egmont Paper No. 33, October 2009 by Biscop, Sven.
THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: 
A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGYEGMONT PAPER 33
THE VALUE OF POWER, 
THE POWER OF VALUES: 
A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
SVEN BISCOP (ed.) 
 
October 2009 The Egmont Papers are published by Academia Press for Egmont – The Royal Institute for
International Relations. Founded in 1947 by eminent Belgian political leaders, Egmont is an
independent think-tank based in Brussels. Its interdisciplinary research is conducted in a spirit of
total academic freedom. A platform of quality information, a forum for debate and analysis, a
melting pot of ideas in the field of international politics, Egmont’s ambition – through its
publications, seminars and recommendations – is to make a useful contribution to the decision-
making process.
***
President: Viscount Etienne DAVIGNON
Director-General: Marc TRENTESEAU
Series Editor: Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP 
***
Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Address Naamsestraat / Rue de Namur 69, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Phone 00-32-(0)2.223.41.14
Fax 00-32-(0)2.223.41.16
E-mail info@egmontinstitute.be
Website: www.egmontinstitute.be
© Academia Press
Eekhout 2
9000 Gent
Tel. 09/233 80 88 Fax 09/233 14 09
Info@academiapress.be www.academiapress.be
J. Story-Scientia NV Wetenschappelijke Boekhandel
Sint-Kwintensberg 87
B-9000 Gent
Tel. 09/225 57 57 Fax 09/233 14 09
Info@story.be www.story.be
All authors write in a personal capacity.
Lay-out: proxess.be
ISBN 978 90 382 1514 3
D/2009/4804/209
U 1357
NUR1 754
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or 
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise 
without the permission of the publishers.1
Table of Contents
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
Why a Grand Strategy Is Needed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
A Cause for Strategy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
On to a True Strategic Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
A Grand Strategy for Whom? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
Values  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
Vital Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
Which Kind of Actor?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
A Power and a Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
Principles and Problems of a Grand Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
A Grand Strategy to Achieve which Objectives? . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
The Neighbourhood. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
Enlargement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
Regional Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
Global and Institutional Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management. . . . . . . . . . . .  30
The Institutions of Grand Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
Conclusion: A New European Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  393
Executive Summary
In its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU has a grand strategy,
embracing all instruments and resources at the disposal of the Union and the
Member States, but a partial one. The ESS tells us how to do things – in a pre-
ventive, holistic and multilateral way – but it is much vaguer on what to do:
what are the concrete objectives and priorities of the EU as a global actor?
The recent debate about the ESS, resulting in the 2008 Report about the Imple-
mentation of the European Security Strategy, failed to answer this question.
Offering little in terms of recommendations for the future, the Report creates an
impression of unfinished business, which the EU can ill afford now that the
Lisbon Treaty will change the institutional set-up of its foreign and security pol-
icy, NATO has launched a strategic debate of its own to which an EU contribu-
tion is essential, and the EU risks being overshadowed by the much more pur-
posive emerging powers or BRICs. Regardless of one’s initial opinion about its
opportunity, a fully-fledged strategic review is now in order, with the aim of
completing the ESS.
The first rule of strategy-making is to know thyself. Which values and interests
should our grand strategy safeguard? Europe has in fact a very distinctive social
model, combining democracy, the market economy and strong government
intervention. Preserving and strengthening this internal social contract between
the EU and its citizens, guaranteeing them security, economic prosperity, politi-
cal freedom and social well-being, is the fundamental objective of the EU, both
internally and as a global actor. The conditions that have to be fulfilled to allow
that constitute the EU’s vital interests: defence against any military threat to the
territory of the Union; open lines of communication and trade (in physical as
well as in cyber space); a secure supply of energy and other vital natural
resources; a clean environment; manageable migration flows; the maintenance
of international law and universally agreed rights; and autonomy of EU deci-
sion-making.
To safeguard these interests, the EU must be a power, i.e. a strategic actor that
consciously and purposely defines long-term objectives, actively pursues these,
and acquires the necessary means to that end. Which kind of power the EU
chooses to be, is also conditioned by the international environment. Marked by
interpolarity, i.e. existential interdependence between an increased number of
global powers, that environment is very challenging, but at the same time
presents the EU with an opportunity to pursue a distinctive grand strategy. In
the absence of enemies and in view of the need for cooperation to tackle globalTHE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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challenges, the best way of defending our interests, in order to defend our model
and values, is precisely to spread those values, because increasing the access of
citizens worldwide to security, prosperity, freedom and well-being directly
addresses the underlying causes of threats and challenges. If the fundamental
objective of the EU is the preservation and strengthening of its internal social
contract, the best way of achieving that is to promote it in the rest of the world
(an external social contract), which moreover constitutes a positive agenda in its
own right. The EU does not seek to coerce others into adopting it, not even
merely to entice them through conditionality, but to convince them of the bene-
fits of our model and values on the basis of shared interests and common chal-
lenges. Thus the recognition of the universality of our values can be gradually
and consensually increased.
The preventive, holistic, and multilateral approach which the EU has pursued is
in line with this grand strategy, but implementation has revealed a number of
unanswered questions. How to avoid the clash between immediate interests and
the emphasis on values, which thus leads to weakness? How to act vis-à-vis the
emerging global powers and integrate them in the multilateral architecture?
What to do when prevention fails and the threat or use of force is required?
The answers to these questions will determine the objectives which a complete
grand strategy should define in more detail. The following priority areas require
the identification of specific EU interests and the definition of concrete objec-
tives, in order to direct sub-strategies, policies and actions:
– The Neigbourhood: What is the desired end-state of the Neighbourhood Pol-
icy? Can only democracy create a consensual value-based community and
thus safeguard our interests, or will democratization create such upheaval
that our interests would be damaged? Only when our interests and red lines
are clear can a true strategic partnership with Russia be pursued.
– Enlargement: A successful instrument so far, further enlargement is deter-
mining for relations with Russia and for the geopolitical position of the EU
– and cannot proceed therefore without strategic debate.
– Regional objectives: A reluctance to discuss interests and join up the different
European presences, from aid and trade to diplomacy, has undermined poli-
cies towards Central Asia, the Gulf and Africa. Other regions too, such as
Asia, Latin America and the Arctic need a thorough assessment of EU inter-
ests to determine whether or not our presence should be stepped up.
– Global and institutional objectives: The EU must sharpen its view about the
multilateral architecture, reconciling reform with increased effectiveness of
EU representation. That should inform a really strategic use of its strategic
partnerships with the BRICs, the existence of which too often seems more
important than their content.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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– Conflict resolution and crisis management: A white book should define
Europe’s ambition as a security actor. Regardless of whether in a specific case
Europeans deploy under the flag of ESDP, NATO or the UN: which types of
operations must European forces be capable of, which priority regions and
scenarios require intervention, and which is the scale of the effort to be
devoted to these priorities?
It is not sufficient to have a more complete grand strategy – the EU must then
also apply it. That requires an institutional follow-up structure. At the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative / Vice-President of the Com-
mission, supported by the External Action Service, should be formally entrusted
with the implementation and development of EU strategy.
A grand strategy that translates the values on which the EU’s own social model
is based into a proactive and constructive foreign policy, aimed at concrete
objectives: on that basis, with the right political leadership, the EU can be a
global power.7
Preface
Why another paper about EU strategy? And grand strategy at that? Because the
debate about the implementation of the European Security Strategy that the EU
organized in 2008 generated great expectations – that were greatly disap-
pointed. This is not a criticism of those who were involved in the debate, as in
fact were many of the authors of this paper. Events conspired to render an exer-
cise which was always going to be difficult almost impossible: the Irish no vote
in June 2008, the Georgian crisis that summer, and then the financial crisis
ensured that little energy remained in the capitals for a true strategic review. The
Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy in which the
debate culminated provides a concise overview of implementation and confirms
the Union’s choice for a holistic and multilateral approach, but offers less in
terms of concrete recommendations for the future.
Our argument is that the EU cannot leave it at that. Because of the – perhaps
exaggerated – expectations, the perception, which the EU can hardly afford, is
one of unfinished business. The Report can therefore only be the end of the
beginning: once started, the exercise must be brought to a good end, regardless
of one’s initial opinion about its opportunity. On the basis of the Report a true
strategic review can yet take place. The result will be a grand strategy, because
that is the scope of the ESS already today, embracing all of the instruments and
resources at the disposal of the EU and the Member States, and because that
expresses the high level of ambition which the EU as a global power must have.
Building on its earlier work on EU strategy, Egmont – Royal Institute for Interna-
tional Relations convened an international working group of academics and prac-
titioners. The aim is not to write a grand strategy – “We the peoples of the Euro-
pean Union...” – that would be too immodest a venture, even for the academics
among us. Our aim is to make the case for a grand strategy, and to pose all the
questions which a grand strategy should address, in order to stimulate the debate.
Like earlier Egmont working groups, ours is an informal group, implying that
all members speak only in their own name and do not represent a country or
institution. While not necessarily agreeing with every single word, all members
of the group subscribe to the spirit and the main arguments of the paper. Those
members who consented to it are listed at the end of the paper; others preferred
to remain anonymous. As the group’s convenor and scribe, I want to express my
sincere gratitude to all members for their contribution. If only all of one’s writ-
ings could be alimented and scrutinized by such distinguished experts...
Sven BISCOP9
Why a Grand Strategy Is Needed
In its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) the EU already has a grand strategy
– but a partial one. Grand strategy, defined by John Gaddis as “the calculated
relationship between means and large ends”, is about defining the long-term
overall foreign policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of
instruments to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-
to-day policy-making and guides the definition of the means – i.e. the civilian
and military capabilities – to be developed. By nature, grand strategy has a
broad scope, integrating all external policies, so in EU terms not just ESDP or
even CFSP, but all relevant Community policies as well. For each of these areas
more detailed strategies must be developed, serving as “sub-strategies” to the
grand strategy.
The ESS does part of this: starting from an analysis of the global environment,
it outlines a holistic approach, putting to use in an integrated way the full range
of instruments for external action, through partnerships and multilateral insti-
tutions, for a permanent policy of prevention and stabilization, and it draws
some implications for the means. This is an important strategic choice, but it
mostly tells us how to do things – the ESS is much vaguer on what to do. So the
issue is not that the ESS is not valid or has been outdated – in fact, it already
mentions all of the so-called new threats and challenges, proof of the authors’
foresight. The issue is that the ESS is incomplete in terms of objectives, because
to start with it is not clear about the values and interests to be defended. A grand
strategy must necessarily be translated into sub-strategies and then policies for
it to be put into action, but the objectives of “building security in our neighbour-
hood” and “effective multilateralism”1 have proved too broad, and Member
States far too hesitant to act upon the strategy that they have adopted, to gener-
ate clear priorities. As a result, the EU has not become markedly more proactive,
capable or coherent since the adoption of the ESS.
A Cause for Strategy
Even with an incomplete grand strategy, the EU could have been more of a glo-
bal power, beyond the area of trade, if it had not been for the half-hearted imple-
mentation of the ESS and Member States’ reluctance to act proactively and col-
lectively. Grand strategy need not start from scratch, as the ESS makes valid
1. Under the heading of “strategic objectives” the ESS also mentions “addressing the threats”, but rather
than setting future-oriented targets, this section is limited to listing past actions and outlining the need for
a preventive and holistic approach.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
10
choices, but a fully-fledged revision is now required, in order to complete it. The
reasons are manifold.
When the December 2007 European Council mandated High Representative
Javier Solana “to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to
proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate,
elements to complement it”, great expectations were raised, but the outcome
was disappointing.2 The December 2008 European Council duly adopted a
Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing
Security in a Changing World, deciding to leave the ESS itself untouched. This
might have been an acceptable result, had the Report offered concrete recom-
mendations to improve implementation – but it did not, although recognizing
that “despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains
work in progress”. Even though partly an issue of expectations management, in
the eyes of many this outcome has once again confirmed the image of a hesitant
and reactive EU, uncertain of its role on the world stage, internally divided and
riddled by institutional blockages. The Report therefore cannot now be the end
of the process – it must be the start of a true strategic review. Even if in 2008
one did not feel a review necessary yet, or thought the timing – before ratifica-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty – not ideal, once undertaken, it must now be brought
to a good end as soon as the political momentum can be created. That would
also bring enhanced clarity, for although the Report – which is longer than the
ESS itself – “does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it”, the existence of the two
documents alongside each other is prone to confusion. Surely, if the EU would
revisit the issue, it would not seek to adopt a “report on the Report”.
The eventual entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty could create the necessary
political momentum, and is an argument in itself in favour of continuing the
review process, in order to incorporate its innovations in the field of foreign and
security policy. The Lisbon Treaty will provide the EU with more and better
tools – a grand strategy should tell us when and why to use them. It should also
be clear where the institutional ownership of a grand strategy lies and who is
responsible for its implementation, an issue on which the ESS remains silent.
The negative perception of the strength of EU strategic thinking comes at a par-
ticular moment because it coincides with NATO’s decision, at its 60th anniver-
sary summit in Strasbourg-Kehl on 4 April 2009, to develop a new Strategic
Concept. The administration of US President Barack Obama will certainly come
to the NATO debate with a clear sense of what it wants, informed by a new
2. For an analysis of the debate, see: Sven Biscop, “Odd Couple or Dynamic Duo? The EU and Strategy in
Times of Crisis”. In: European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 14, 2009, No. 3, pp. 367-384.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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National Security Strategy. If the EU as well arrives at the table with a revised
grand strategy, or at least with a unified position based on further debate, Euro-
peans have a unique chance to influence the debate: if the EU and the US first
define their own priorities, where they meet a truly shared NATO strategy can
emerge.3 That NATO’s Strategic Concept is a function of EU and US strategy
ought to be self-evident, as the former concerns only the military dimension of
the comprehensive scope of both of the latter – the US would never contemplate
having NATO’s military strategy determine its grand strategy, and neither
should the EU. If however European Allies join the debate individually, pretend-
ing that the EU does not exist, and continue the schizophrenic practice of adopt-
ing contradictory positions in NATO and the Union, the result can only be a
one-sided Strategic Concept, which not reflecting a true consensus cannot be
expected to generate forceful action either.
This is not about choosing for or against NATO – it is about the effectiveness of
the Transatlantic partnership, which will remain the EU’s most important alli-
ance. As long as those Member States that are more Atlantic-oriented con-
sciously hinder CFSP/ESDP, and those that are more EU-oriented consciously
hinder NATO, both will underperform. As a military alliance, NATO is not the
place to address all of the challenges that Europeans want to discuss with the
US. In practice, NATO has already lost much of its centrality, as a consequence
of the end of the Cold War and the broadening of our concept of security. No
longer the only forum where Europeans and Americans discuss security, the
political centre of gravity has shifted to what are de facto the Alliance’s two
“pillars”, and to direct discussions between them – the EU and the US. Europe-
ans have but one option therefore: to choose once and for all to act as the EU in
diplomacy and defence and build a much deepened and operational direct EU-
US partnership, going beyond the current summitry. The EU and the US are the
fully-fledged international actors that can wage a comprehensive foreign policy;
NATO is the technical platform at their disposal when, in the context of their
political partnership, they decide to act together militarily. The US can only ben-
efit: whereas today it can easily dominate a divided set of Allies that cannot
contribute much, it will gain a united Ally, which will demand a greater say in
decision-making, but with which real burden-sharing will be possible. It is not
less evident to debate diplomacy and defence than it is to debate trade with the
US as an equal partner – provided of course that the EU does what it takes to
become an equal partner in those areas as well. Only then will it be taken seri-
ously. The EU has only to act on the ESS: “Our aim should be an effective and
balanced partnership with the USA”.
3. Simon Serfaty & Sven Biscop, A Shared Security Strategy for a Euro-Atlantic Partnership of Equals.
Washington DC, CSIS, July 2009.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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Recent events have shown that in some cases NATO, for political reasons, is not
suitable as a framework for action either: deployment under the NATO flag was
not an option in Lebanon in 2006 – although the EU eventually decided to rein-
force UNIFIL rather than launch an ESDP operation; in the Georgian crisis,
NATO was part of the problem rather than the solution, leaving the EU as the
only available mediator, in the absence of US leadership; and even in the anti-
piracy operations off Somalia starting end 2008 it has proved much more diffi-
cult for NATO than for the EU to interact with the countries of the region. This
is not to say that NATO will never be the best option in a specific situation, but
it proves that more leadership will – rightly – be expected from the EU, notably
by the US, especially with regard to its neighbourhood and beyond. And leader-
ship requires strategy.
Current EU strategic thinking does not seem up to that level of proactive engage-
ment, which is all the more evident by contrasting it with the much more pur-
posive action of other global powers that do act strategically in function of
explicit interests, notably the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China, as well as
other “emerging” actors), and of course the US. That is not to say that they are
always successful in achieving their objectives or that their diagnosis is always
correct and far-sighted – but at least they appear to have a clear idea of what
their immediate objectives are. In the words of Jo Coelmont: “While the EU is
playing ping pong, they are playing chess”. Most of them do not regard the EU
as a strategic actor, and are adept at playing off one Member State against the
other, as the EU is only too good at “divide and rule”: by dividing itself, others
rule. Even in the economic field, where it is a global power, the EU undermines
itself. Naturally, the EU is hampered by its collective decision-making when
compared with presidential or even authoritarian regimes: all the more reason
to deepen its collective strategic thinking and give more direction to decision-
making. Every analysis points in the same direction: “The future will be domi-
nated by large, strategic players”.4 If they want to safeguard their interests and
not be pulled apart, Europeans have no choice but to act as a “large, strategic
player” themselves, i.e. to act collectively and with a clear sense of purpose. This
does not necessarily imply that the EU must now also play traditional power
politics, but it does mean that the EU must choose which type of power it wants
to be.
4. Jolyon Howorth, “The Case for an EU Grand Strategy”. In: Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth & Bastian
Giegerich, Europe: A Time for Strategy. Egmont Paper 27. Brussels, Egmont, 2009.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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On to a True Strategic Review
The EU has arrived at a stage where its own further development without strat-
egy appears difficult. European integration has always been an open-ended
process, into which policy fields were incorporated in a mostly ad hoc fashion,
but that approach has reached it limits. Enlargement has reached the point
where major strategic choices have to be made, for the accession of Turkey or
Ukraine would substantially change the strategic picture. The difficulties sur-
rounding first the Constitutional and then the Lisbon Treaty, and the resulting
institutional standstill, demonstrate the need for a new project, for a new narra-
tive for the EU as a whole, to be translated into resolute joint action (in combat-
ing the crisis e.g.) in order to give renewed impetus to and mobilize public opin-
ion for European integration. A grand strategy for the EU as a global actor is an
essential part of that.
It is quite conceivable that the 2008 ESS debate caused “strategic fatigue” in the
Member States and the EU institutions, and the issue disappeared from the
agenda after the adoption of the Implementation Report. But for all the reasons
above, the Report cannot be the end of the process. Rather, the ESS together
with the work done for the Report should now be the basis for a true review.15
A Grand Strategy for Whom?
The first rule of strategy-making could simply be: know thyself. Seemingly evi-
dent, it is actually not that clear which values and interests the EU seeks to
safeguard, and which kind of international actor it wants to be.
Values
The Treaty defines the values on which the EU is based and which it states
should also guide its foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty extends this definition,
putting additional emphasis on equality, solidarity and human dignity.5 This
highlights what is in fact most distinctive about the EU model of society: the
combination of democracy, the market economy, and strong state intervention,
at Member State and EU levels, to ensure fair competition and social security.
This European social model, including the values on which it is based, can be
conceptualized as a social contract between EU citizens, which are all entitled to
an integral whole of public goods, and the EU and the Member States, whose
responsibility it is to provide these goods:
– Security or freedom from fear.
– Economic prosperity or freedom from want.
– Political freedom: democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.
– Social well-being: health, education, and a clean environment.
Some of these values have been officially recognized as universal rights, e.g. in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although sadly not all signatories
act upon it. The universality of other values is contested, in some cases including
within the EU. Obviously, the stronger the cohesion of the European model, the
stronger the foundations on which to base EU foreign policy.
Arguably, next to guaranteeing peace among its members, the European social
model is Europe’s most successful achievement. Therefore, when this social con-
tract is perceived to be threatened, it is one of the main reasons for citizens’
5. See Art. 2: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minor-
ities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination,
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”; and Art. 21, §1: “The
Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own
creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the
rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for
human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United
Nations Charter and international law”.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
16
disenchantment with the EU.6 The economic and financial crisis demonstrates
that Europe’s almost unique success in guaranteeing a high standard of living to
the large majority of its citizens should not be taken for granted. At the same
time, it can – or ought to – be a source of soft power, because of its attractiveness
to others.
The fundamental objective of the EU, both internally and externally, can thus be
defined as the preservation and strengthening for its citizens of the security, eco-
nomic, political and social dimensions of the European social model and the
values on which it is based.
Vital Interests
An assessment of the conditions that have to be fulfilled for this fundamental
objective to be achieved, allows identifying the EU’s vital interests, i.e. those that
determine the very survival of its model:
– Defence against any military threat to the territory of the Union.
– Open lines of communication and trade (in physical as well as in cyber
space).
– A secure supply of energy and other vital natural resources.
– A clean environment.
– Manageable migration flows.
– The maintenance of international law and universally agreed rights.
– Autonomy of EU decision-making.
These vital interests are common to all Member States, who no longer have
national vital interests, different from those of other Member States. Too often,
“to have an interest” is confused with “being interested”: Belgium may be more
interested in Central Africa and Poland in Ukraine, but objectively the stability
of both is equally important to, and thus equally in the interest of both Brussels
and Warsaw. Moreover, not only do Member States share the same vital inter-
ests, they are also inextricably related, as a consequence of the ever-deepening
integration and interdependence within the EU. The vital interests of one Mem-
ber State can no longer be separated from those of another; a threat to the vital
interests of one inevitably threatens all. Finally, no single Member State any
longer has the resources to safeguard all of its vital interests on its own – at the
global level, all Member States are small States.
6. Guy Verhofstadt, The United States of Europe: Manifesto for a New Europe. London, The Federal
Trust for Education and Research, 2006.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
17
An issue about which the ESS largely remains silent, interests cannot be ignored.
The negative connotation that the notion has acquired in the eyes of many is
neither justified nor rational, for interests are at the heart of policy-making. All
actors evidently pursue their interests. In itself, that is neither positive nor neg-
ative – the question is how they are pursued or, in other words, which kind of
actor the EU decides to be.
Which Kind of Actor?
The answer to that question is determined by the EU’s values, which guide its
foreign policy, and is conditioned by the international environment, i.e. the
threats, challenges, and actors, which are analyzed in the ESS and the Implemen-
tation Report.
In terms of threats, i.e. issues that imply a risk of violence and therefore may
ultimately demand a military response, today’s environment is relatively benign.
As the ESS states: “Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now
improbable”. Other threats are indeed “more diverse, less visible and less pre-
dictable”: terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure –
but today none of these constitutes an immediate vital threat. That does not
mean that they can be ignored, for if left unattended more serious threats to EU
territory may again develop. In the long term, even inter-state war between
major actors cannot be excluded, unlikely though it appears today; even if the
EU would not be directly involved, the implications would be enormous. It does
imply however that, fortunately, the EU can now afford not to focus on military
power alone.
At the same time, today’s environment contains a number of major challenges,
all complex, global and interrelated, and potentially having a multiplier effect
on the threats: poverty, climate change, scarcity of energy, water, and other nat-
ural resources, and large-scale migration. Because of globalisation, the depend-
ence of the EU and hence its vulnerability to these threats and challenges have
greatly increased. Finally, in terms of actors, the environment is marked by
growing multipolarity and a relative shift in the distribution of power: as the
military, economic and soft power of other global actors increases (though not
at the same pace in all dimensions of power or in all of these States), the relative
importance of the EU declines, notably vis-à-vis the BRICs. Although in abso-
lute terms the EU still is the major economic power, on par only with the US, itTHE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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is confronted with increasingly active other players, and thus sees its leverage
decreasing, both in bilateral relations and multilateral forums.7
How to interpret this environment? Although undoubtedly very challenging, it
also contains elements on which the EU can build constructive engagement. For
one, the EU has no enemies: not a single State has the capacity or even the inten-
tion to directly confront it militarily. Secondly, the world is marked not just by
increasing multipolarity, but also by increasing interdependence between the
poles. Although other global actors often have different worldviews and com-
peting objectives, all are increasingly interlinked economically, and all are con-
fronted with the same complex global challenges that can be successfully
addressed only in cooperation between them. If the United States’ unipolar
moment has clearly passed, the defining characteristic of today’s world is not
just multipolarity, which focuses too exclusively on relative power, but what
Giovanni Grevi has dubbed “interpolarity”, which takes into account this
“deepening, existential interdependence” between the powers, in spite of the
competition between them. Global interdependence is so great that “its misman-
agement can threaten not only the prosperity, but the political stability and ulti-
mately, in extreme cases, the very survival of the actors that belong to the sys-
tem”; therefore “the ability to shape multilateral cooperation or lead collective
action in addressing international challenges becomes a central feature of
power”.8
This context does not guarantee the absence of tension or strife between the
powers, but it constitutes a great opportunity. In the past international stability
under conditions of multipolarity has been possible for long periods, when
shared objectives linked the great powers together in a social contract which all
subscribed to, not out of altruism, but because it allowed them to maintain great
power status and to secure their vital interests. If it provides benefits to all, such
leadership is acceptable to the “secondary” powers.9 No environment could be
more amenable to the creation of such a social contract than interpolarity. In the
absence of enemies and in view of the need for cooperation to tackle common
challenges, EU grand strategy need not be threat-based – that generates a sense
of urgency but also fear and introspection10 – nor need it focus on the “tradi-
tional”, coercive use of power. Instead, it can focus on values: the best way of
7. Thomas Renard, A BRIC in the World: Emerging Powers, Europe, and the Coming Order. Egmont
Paper No. 31. Brussels, Egmont, 2009.
8. Giovanni Grevi, The Interpolar World: A New Scenario. Occasional Paper 79. Paris, EUISS, 2009, p.
24.
9. Rik Coolsaet, International Stability, Multipolarity, and the Social Contract. Paper presented at the
ACUNS 2009 Annual Meeting.
10. Giovanni Grevi, “Framing the European Strategic Debate”. In: Studia Diplomatica, Vol. 61, 2008,
No. 3, pp. 5-18.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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defending our interests in order to defend our model and values, is precisely to
spread those values, because increasing the access of citizens worldwide to the
same core public goods (security, prosperity, freedom, well-being) directly
addresses the underlying causes of threats and challenges. In other words, if the
fundamental objective of the EU is the preservation and strengthening of the
European social model and the values on which it is based (its internal social
contract), the best way of achieving that is to promote it in the rest of the world
(an external social contract), which moreover constitutes a positive agenda in its
own right. EU grand strategy can thus be constructive,11 aimed at achieving
objectives that are in the enlightened self-interest of the EU – that is what policy
is about – but which also directly benefit others and thus express a feeling of
responsibility for and solidarity with the have-nots.
“[The EU’s] achievements are the results of a distinctive European approach to
foreign and security policy”, states the Implementation Report. Distinctiveness
is not an objective per se, but this is a distinctive grand strategy, different from
that of all other global actors. The EU refrains from the aggressive use of force
and uses coercion (by diplomatic, economic, and as a last resort, military means)
only when vital interests are threatened, and does not seek to establish spheres
of influence, but pursues its interests through a preventive, holistic and multilat-
eral approach based on the promotion of its model and values. It does not seek
to coerce others into adopting it, not even merely to entice them through condi-
tionality, but to convince them of the benefits of our model and values through
cooperation on the basis of shared interests and common challenges. Thus mar-
rying multilateralism and partnership to multipolarity, the recognition of the
universality of our values can be gradually and consensually increased.
A Power and a Project
Labels abound to describe the EU: civilian, normative, or transformative power,
puissance  tranquille – if a label is required, perhaps “positive power” can
serve.12 More important than the adjective is the noun: the EU must be a power,
11. “The EU is not attempting to compete militarily with other world powers, the EU is not building up a
military capacity independent of that of its member states, the EU is not trying to acquire WMD, the EU
has no territorial claims to make, the EU does not intend to intervene militarily to change regimes, and the
EU is determined to work hand-in-hand with the United Nations. In short, as it embodies a new category
of international actor, the EU’s approach to global relations is different from the traditional approach of
major powers. As a consequence, the rest of the world welcomes the European Union as a new kind of
more constructive actor in global relations.” Martin Ortega, Building the Future. The EU’s contribution
to Global Governance. Chaillot Paper 100. Paris, EUISS, 2007, p. 93.
12. Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy. A Global Agenda for Positive Power. Aldershot, Ash-
gate, 2005.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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i.e. a strategic actor that consciously and purposely defines long-term objectives,
actively pursues these, and acquires the necessary means to that end. Being a
model for others to emulate is not sufficient, for too many, swayed by national-
ism, radicalism, fundamentalism or just cynicism, simply no longer see the EU
as a model. Attractiveness alone does not generate soft power – the EU must be
seen to act upon its strategy. The EU therefore cannot be a status quo power that
seeks to maintain current conditions: its agenda entails a commitment to proac-
tively shape the environment.
The idea of the EU as a power is mentioned neither in the ESS nor in the Imple-
mentation Report – the former only states that because of its weight the EU “is
inevitably a global player”. To be a power demands a much more self-confident
and voluntaristic outlook. The European Council’s Laeken Declaration (15
December 2001) actually already put it in much more assertive terms:
“Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalised, yet also
highly fragmented world, Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in
the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power
resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism,
but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s heartrending injus-
tices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in
such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest.
A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other
words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development.”
The EU definitely has the means to be a power – if that is what it wants to be.
This brings us back to the starting point: a grand strategy for whom? An EU that
is a mere market simply cannot be a grand strategic actor. This is Europe as a
process: a platform for functional economic cooperation between sovereign
States, which may continue to evolve in function of the technical needs of the
internal market. Such a Europe does not constitute a pole of the multipolar
world; it lacks the centre of gravity to be a strategic actor. But as argued above,
if Europe wants to safeguard its interests vis-à-vis the other large strategic
actors, it has no choice but to become one itself. That automatically entails the
choice for Europe as a project: an ever deepening political union in which Mem-
ber States pool sovereignty in order to pursue their common vision with maxi-
mum effect.21
Principles and Problems of a Grand Strategy
The decision which kind of international actor the EU wants to be thus equals
the choice for a specific approach, which is based on the promotion of its own
model, and which at heart is preventive, holistic, and multilateral. These three
principles constitute the how to do things advocated by the ESS and the Imple-
mentation Report.
Principles
The first principle is prevention: “This implies that we should be ready to act
before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too
early”, as the ESS states. A permanent strategy of prevention and stabilisation,
addressing the root causes of threats and challenges, aims to prevent conflict so
that, ideally, coercion and the use of force will not be necessary. Addressing the
root causes means to close the gap, both within and between countries, between
the haves and the have-nots in terms of access to the core public goods: security,
prosperity, freedom and well-being. For this gap generates feelings of frustration
and marginalization on the part of those that are excluded economically or
politically, radicalisation and extremism of various kinds, social and economic
instability, massive migration flows, and tension and conflicts within and
between States. Effective prevention is an enormous challenge, for it means
addressing a much wider range of issues, at a much earlier stage, across the
globe, because as the ESS says “the first line of defence will often be abroad”.
Closing the gap between haves and have-nots of necessity demands a holistic
approach, the second principle, for our social model is comprehensive as such.
The security, economic, political and social dimensions are inextricably related
– an individual cannot enjoy any one core public good unless having access to
them all – and all are present, in differing degrees, in all threats and challenges.
In the ESS: “none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled
by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments”. Therefore
every foreign policy must simultaneously address all dimensions, making use in
an integrated way of all available instruments: “Diplomatic efforts, develop-
ment, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda”. This
is perhaps the core phrase in the ESS: “The best protection for our security is a
world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, support-
ing social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power,
establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of
strengthening the international order”.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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Such a holistic approach is best implemented via multilateralism, the third prin-
ciple: “We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation
in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors”,
according to the ESS. Only in cooperation with others can our objectives be
achieved peacefully, only in cooperation with all global actors can global chal-
lenges be successfully addressed, and only in cooperation with a wide range of
actors can complex issues be comprehensively tackled. “The development of a
stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a
rule-based international order is our objective”, declares the ESS under the
heading of “effective multilateralism”. Multilateralism is “effective” to the
extent that the ensemble of regimes, mechanisms and institutions manages to
provide access to the core public goods to citizens worldwide.
These are indeed principles of foreign policy, i.e. the EU pursues them as a mat-
ter of principle, even when in specific circumstances doing so may render a task
more difficult. The reason why it is not a matter of choice is that these principles
reflect the values on which our internal social contract is based; therefore they
determine the EU’s soft power, i.e. the credibility and legitimacy of the external
social contract that we pursue.
Problems
Although these are well established principles, their translation into practice
raises questions which the ESS and the Implementation Report do not address.
At least three core issues demand a thorough debate.
The EU has pursued its agenda mainly via “positive conditionality”, establish-
ing comprehensive partnerships that promise benefits in function of reforms
undertaken by the partner country in a variety of fields. In practice, except in
the case of enlargement that approach has seldom yielded the hoped for results.
On the one hand, the proverbial carrot on offer is not always what interests the
partner the most, e.g. access to the EU’s labour or agricultural market, while on
the other hand it is often accorded quite regardless of the partner’s performance.
The EU too often applies double standards, condemning in one country what it
discreetly overlooks in another, and too rarely manages a coherent approach,
without one EU policy undercutting another. In combination with the fact that
as a result of the rise of other global powers, the envisaged partner countries can
now shop around and seek partnership with the one that offers the most inter-
esting conditions – or the least conditionality – EU leverage appears limited,
especially vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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The fundamental dilemma that the EU has yet to solve is what to do when its
interests (e.g. energy supply, control of migration, fight against terrorism) gen-
erate short-term demands (e.g. cooperation with authoritarian regimes) that
clash with its inherently longer-term method of pursuing its interests at the
grand strategic level, i.e. with the promotion of its model outside the EU. The
EU cannot afford to continue to ignore this dilemma, for already the contrast
between high-flown rhetoric about human rights and democracy and mostly
rather hesitant policies in practice, has greatly damaged its credibility and legit-
imacy. Too many perceive the EU as a status quo actor, prioritizing economic
and security interests and not sincerely committed to promoting reform.
A first serious debate is in order, about the objectives which the EU should set
at the grand strategic level, and about how to translate those in sub-strategies,
policies and actions, in order to ensure that the emphasis on values does not lead
to weakness. Should the EU prioritize certain values among those that constitute
its model, in order to reconcile its long-term strategy of prevention and stabili-
zation with the immediate needs demanded by its interests? Must human rights
be prioritized before democracy, as the former can be promoted without chal-
lenging the nature of a regime, thus allowing cooperation in other fields? Can
good governance be an indirect way towards democratization? Which “carrots”
can be offered to increase the effectiveness of conditionality? Should more dif-
ferentiated regional strategies be adopted? What, on the other hand, is the min-
imum threshold below which the EU cannot accept to deal with any regime,
even to the detriment of short-term interests?
The EU must in any case be conscious of the limits of conditionality: vis-à-vis
regional organizations and other global powers, it is not an option, for interde-
pendence is too great and the scale of things too vast for the EU to have any
serious leverage. On the contrary, pontificating without acting only serves to
further undermine EU soft power, especially as some of the other global powers
in their modern – as opposed to the post-modern EU – outlook are bound to ask
how many divisions the EU has. Such actors can only be convinced of the value
of the EU model on the basis of shared interests and common challenges. A
second debate therefore concerns EU objectives as regards its strategic partner-
ships with regional organizations and global actors, which implies a debate
about the EU’s view on the future of the multilateral institutions. While some of
the current strategic partners evidently are global powers, the global role of oth-
ers is less obvious or limited to specific policy areas. Apart from installing vari-
ous annual meetings and summits, it is not clear what strategic partnership
entails: which common objectives and joint actions are to be pursued in which
policy areas? Who takes the lead in these partnerships on the EU side? How canTHE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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the proliferation of bilateral partnerships be squared with the promotion of
regional integration and multilateralism?
Finally, the third debate is about what to do if, in spite of all positive intentions,
prevention fails and conflict does erupt. What is the EU view on the threat and
use of force? The ESS remains vague. It calls for “a strategic culture that fosters
early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention”. Such intervention is put
in a multilateral context, as regards who is to act – “The United Nations Security
Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security” – and why to act – “We want international organizations,
regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace
and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken”.
Read together with other EU documents, such as the 2004 Paper for Submission
to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,13 and looking at
the practice of the EU and its Member States, it is evident that the use of force
is seen as an instrument of last resort, which in principle is used only with a
Security Council mandate. Together with “a new European consensus that the
use of military force abroad can be legitimate for the purpose of protecting vul-
nerable ethnic groups against massive violations of their human rights”, these
are the main elements of what Christoph Meyer concludes is an increasingly
shared view among Member States about “humanitarian power Europe”.14 Yet
although a shared strategic culture thus seems to be emerging, this has never
been translated into clear priorities for ESDP.
The debate on these major issues – conditionality, strategic partnerships and the
multilateral architecture, and the use of force – will be determining for the objec-
tives which a grand strategy should define in more detail.
13. In this paper the EU first reaffirms its commitment to the holistic approach, stressing the need for
“economic, political and legal instruments, as well as military instruments, and close cooperation between
states as well as international organizations across a range of sectors”. When crisis management is in
order, a gradual and comprehensive process of intervention is outlined, going from “the reinforcement of
institutions, the security system, and the promotion of economic and social development”, through “the
mandating of a civilian mission”, to “carefully targeted sanctions” and finally, “if warranted by ongoing
security conditions and crisis management needs, the mandating of a rapid reaction force and/or a mili-
tary peacekeeping mission”.
14. Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on Security and
Defence in the European Union. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006, p. 141. To a similar conclusion comes Bas-
tian Giegerich, European Security and Strategic Culture. National Responses to the EU’s Security and
Defence Policy. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006.25
A Grand Strategy to Achieve which Objectives?
The whole aim of continuing the review process started in 2008 is to define in
more detail the EU’s strategic objectives. Of course, a grand strategy is not an
operational document – it will always be a guide for day-to-day policy-making.
But the clearer the strategic objectives, the more they will generate purposive
action. Therefore, on the basis of its vital interests the EU should identify its
specific interests in each of the areas below and set more concrete objectives, for
all fields of external action, in order to direct its sub-strategies, policies and
actions.
The Neighbourhood
The ESS is the most specific about the EU’s neighbourhood: “Our task is to
promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union
and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and
cooperative relations”. In this region the EU is most clearly trying to bring its
holistic approach into practice and for it the EU has defined the most elaborate
sub-strategies: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and more recently the Union for the Mediterra-
nean and the Eastern Partnership. Because of its proximity, it is the region where
arguably the EU has the most leverage, and where developments have the most
direct impact on the EU – “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still
important”, the ESS rightly notes. And yet, the region also provides the clearest
illustration of the clash between the immediate pursuit of EU interests and the
longer-term promotion of EU values, as high-flown rhetoric about democracy
and human rights is overshadowed by an emphasis on practical cooperation on
energy, migration and terrorism, even with the most authoritarian regimes.
None of the sub-strategies has effectively addressed this fundamental dilemma.
“The Mediterranean [...] still poses complex challenges, such as insufficient
political reform and illegal migration”, says the Implementation Report with a
certain sense of understatement, while in the eastern neighbourhood the Georgia
crisis highlighted the region’s volatility.
Basically, the desired end-state of the ENP remains unclear. The establishment
of “a ring of well governed countries” could imply full-scale democratization as
the means of building long-term stability and a truly consensual value-based
community with our neighbours, thus safeguarding our interests. Or democra-
tization could cause such upheaval as to make consensual spreading of our val-
ues impossible and thus damage our interests; an alternative, more modestTHE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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objective must then be defined. Is there a threshold in terms of human rights
standards below which partnership should be renounced and visible measures
adopted? Should the strategic objective not be further differentiated between
our eastern and southern neighbourhood? Until now, a reticence to openly dis-
cuss EU interests has prevented a thorough debate on these questions. Waging
the debate in such terms would lead to a more transparent discussion and would
allow to identify which shared interests and common threats and challenges
between the EU and its neighbours can be the basis for cooperation, and how
such cooperation can be extended to specific elements of our model and values,
so that gradually the root causes of the threats and challenges can be addressed.
“Positive conditionality” that is much more targeted and consistent – i.e. that
sincerely takes into account the extent to which the partner lives up to its end of
the deal – will be an additional stimulus.
EU strategic objectives for its eastern neighbourhood cannot be decoupled from
those vis-à-vis Russia, with which the ESS just says “[w]e should continue to
work for closer relations”. In practice, EU interests in Russia are quite evident;
in view of their proximity and mutual dependence in the energy field, Brussels
and Moscow have no option but to establish a close working relationship. The
vital precondition is first that the EU acts as one, for Europe’s relations with
Russia are a prime example of “self-divide and be ruled over”. Secondly, the EU
must define in much more concrete terms its interests and objectives towards its
eastern neighbourhood and, further a field, the Caucasus – quick EU action after
the 2008 Georgia crisis hides the fact that in reality EU objectives towards the
region are all but clear. Only when they are, and the EU knows what its red lines
are, can a true strategic partnership with Russia be pursued. The EU should not
fear Russia, nor should it be in favour of everything that Russia is against and
vice versa – Brussels must “simply” make policy in function of its interests and
priorities. In the Implementation Report: “Our partnership should be based on
respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule of law,
and market economic principles as well as on common interests and objectives”.
Only a united EU can, and should, make Russia understand however that if red
lines are crossed, “there is a price to be paid, including in [its] relationship with
the [EU]”, to borrow a phrase from the ESS.
Enlargement
Debating EU objectives for “the east”, i.e. for the European continent, implies
debating EU enlargement. Enlargement has so far been used as a very successful
instrument, ensuring peace and stability on the continent. It is not evident how-
ever that further enlargement would bring further such benefits. If the accessionTHE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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of Iceland and eventually the Balkan countries – and perhaps one day Norway
and Switzerland – is relatively uncontroversial, membership for Belarus or
Ukraine would be determining for relations with Russia, while membership for
Turkey would expand the EU into a whole new geographic area and thus be
determining for its geopolitical position. Unless the EU aims to duplicate the
UN, enlargement is a finite instrument in any case – whether further enlarge-
ment is still in order requires a careful balancing of the strategic pros and cons.
In any case further enlargement without substantial deepening of the Union –
notably qualified majority voting in the CFSP – is unadvisable. The answer given
to this question by a grand strategy must not necessarily be definite – but a grand
strategy must answer it.
An EU grand strategy should also have a view about NATO enlargement, for
that has an equally great impact on Russia, with evident implications for the EU.
The vital interests and strategic objectives of the EU, together with those of the
US, covering the whole spectrum of relations with Russia, should determine
NATO policies, not the other way around – the Alliance’s absence in the Geor-
gian crisis has amply demonstrated that NATO is not the appropriate actor to
pilot our Russia strategy. This is another reason why an EU grand strategy is
needed as the basis for a common European contribution to the debate about a
new NATO strategic concept. Similarly, an EU grand strategy should put for-
ward which role it sees for the OSCE. In the ESS, the OSCE is mentioned only
very briefly, on par with the Council of Europe: “For the European Union, the
strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a partic-
ular significance”. The EU and its Member States could probably make better
use of their prominent position in the OSCE, if there were more effective coor-
dination between the two.
Regional Objectives
The ESS does not define objectives for regions other than the neighbourhood, in
spite of obvious EU interests, in the areas adjacent to its neighbourhood to start
with, notably the Gulf and Central Asia. The EU has established relations with
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including annual ministerial meetings,
but except for the economic dimension cooperation is limited. In June 2004 The
European Council adopted the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterra-
nean and the Middle East, which sought to apply the holistic approach of the
ENP/EMP to relations with the GCC countries, plus Yemen, Iran and Iraq.
These have proved to have a very limited interest in the initiative however; not
a lot has been heard about it since its adoption. The June 2007 European Coun-
cil adopted The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, focusingTHE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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on political dialogue, education, rule of law, human rights and energy. Both in
Central Asia and the Gulf region the dilemma between interests and values
presents itself in even starker terms than in the neighbourhood. Many of the
regimes are even more intransigent and moreover possess important energy
assets, while the desired end-state is even vaguer. A grand strategy should pro-
vide more guidance.
Sub-Sahara Africa goes almost unmentioned in the ESS, in spite of the EU’s
enormous presence as a development, humanitarian and security actor. There is
no lack of frameworks: in 2007 a Joint Africa-EU Strategy was adopted, fol-
lowed by a First Action Plan (2008-2010), many African States are partners in
the ACP-framework, and the EU is increasingly cooperating with the African
Union. And yet, the EU’s interests and strategic objectives remain very vague –
the EU being particularly reticent to discuss Africa policy in those terms – hence
coordination and sense of purpose could be much strengthened. On the one
hand the absence of a truly holistic approach often leads to contradictions
between EU policies, with trade notably undercutting aid; on the other hand
there is an extreme reluctance to integrate development in the broader foreign
policy framework and capitalize on the volume of the EU’s efforts to pursue
objectives in other areas of external action. All the while other global actors are
increasing their presence, in a much more resolute way. The idea is not that the
EU joins this “scramble for Africa”, but its grand strategy should prioritize and
provide a common purpose for its presence on the continent, for integrated EU
policies and European-African partnership to become much more effective.
“Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the
world”, says the ESS. A grand strategy should look beyond the regions where
the EU traditionally is present – a global power cannot ignore any part of the
globe. Whether or not it is true that the centre of gravity is shifting to the Asia-
Pacific, the EU should assess what its specific interests in the region and its sub-
regions are. Even if in the end the EU would not greatly step up its presence, at
least EU policies would then be the result of a thorough assessment, rather then
what now appears a gap in its strategic thinking. Similarly, Latin America
requires a lot more analysis, and the Arctic, where important geopolitical devel-
opments are taking place. In all of these regions, the EU purports to promote
regional integration, and has concluded strategic partnerships – the effective
pursuit of these policies demands a lot more strategic thinking about EU aims.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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Global and Institutional Objectives
“At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order”, states
the Implementation Report, “[...] We have a unique moment to renew multilat-
eralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the
world”. A thorough assessment of EU interests in the various regions of the
globe and a clearer definition of its objectives is a prerequisite for refocusing the
EU’s strategic partnerships with regional organizations and individual global
actors. At the same time, a prioritization of actions to be taken to tackle the
global challenges, in function of the Union’s vital interests, is in order. On many
of these issues – climate, migration, energy – the EU already has elaborate poli-
cies – these must be integrated into its broader foreign policy framework.
Finally, the EU must sharpen its view on how best to organize the multilateral
architecture. To be effective and legitimate, the multilateral architecture must
evidently be adapted to take into account the growing importance of the
“emerging” global actors. Can the EU, which clearly is over-represented, con-
tribute to such reforms while making its own representation more effective, e.g.
by compensating for the loss of European seats by speaking much more with one
voice? Which are the EU’s preferred multilateral forums? How e.g. does the EU
assess the growing role of the G20? The EU cannot afford to dither, for things
are moving fast, as the rise of the G20 demonstrates. Without proactive involve-
ment, Europe will be running behind the facts.
Taken together, these regional, global and institutional interests and objectives
could inform a really strategic use of the strategic partnerships. Rather than
objectives in their own right, the strategic partnerships are instruments to fur-
ther “effective multilateralism”. The EU could identify shared interests with
each of its strategic partners, in order to establish in a number of priority policy
areas effective practical cooperation with those strategic partners that share EU
interests in that specific domain, with the ultimate aim of institutionalizing those
forms of cooperation and linking them up with the permanent multilateral insti-
tutions. Such a pragmatic approach of coalition-building and practical cooper-
ation, on very specific issues to start with, can expand into broader areas,
including with regard to values. If e.g. it is unlikely that we will see China at the
forefront of democracy promotion, it has an economic interest in promoting the
rule of law , if only to ensure that the mining concessions it acquires are not
simultaneously offered to someone else. Such a process, forging an external
social contract, could allow the EU to gradually and consensually increase the
minimal standards to which everyone should adhere, thus slowly but surely
strengthening the recognition of the universality of our values.THE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
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Rather than asking with which State or organization a strategic partnership
should be concluded, the EU should look beyond those already in existence and
involve actors in constructive cooperation in function of their power in the spe-
cific area concerned. In practice, two types of partners may eventually emerge:
those with which the EU establishes cooperation in a comprehensive range of
areas – probably at least Russia, China and India, if they would be inclined to
such cooperation that is, and of course the US; and those with whom coopera-
tion focuses on a more limited range of issues or regions.
For the strategic partnerships to work, the EU must speak with one voice. At the
very least, Member States should subscribe to a rule of transparency and auto-
matically inform the EU, at an early stage, of all important bilateral arrange-
ments with strategic partners, so as to allow for debate in the EU institutions
and de-conflicting of potentially competing interests. Ideally, on key issues, stra-
tegic partnerships could establish the EU as the unique interlocutor on a series
of key issues, hence limiting the margin of manoeuvre of individual Member
States.
Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management
The EU’s interests and objectives in a region should determine to which extent
the EU will contribute to, or even take the lead in conflict resolution and crisis
management, through diplomatic, civilian and military instruments. If the EU’s
engagement for global peace and security can be stepped up, there are, sadly, too
many conflicts and crises for the EU to deal effectively with all of them, certainly
in a leading role. Therefore, as the Report states, “We need to prioritise our
commitments, in line with resources”. In view of the sensitivity of the use of the
military instrument, and the need to justify the use of hard power in the context
of the EU’s distinctive grand strategy without creating suspicion on the part of
the other global actors, that holds true especially for ESDP. On this EU strategic
thinking is the least explicit. There is a missing link between the vague ambition
expressed in the ESS – “to share in the responsibility for global security” – and
the practice of ESDP operations and capability development.
First of all, there is not even consensus about which tasks or types of operations
the EU can undertake. Most Member States do put their forces in harm’s way,
for national and NATO operations or coalitions of the willing. Yet although
legally the EU’s Petersberg Tasks include operations at the high end of the spec-
trum of violence, politically the Member States are still extremely divided over
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Secondly, priority regions and scenarios must be defined, in function of Europe’s
vital interests: where and why will the EU deploy troops and perhaps even go to
war? Because of its proximity, the neighbourhood logically appears as a clear
priority, where the EU should not only be active but also take the lead. In the
ESS “Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority” – although
that clear statement does not necessarily translate into proactive engagement –
and the Implementation Report adds that “We need a sustained effort to address
conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and between Israel
and the Arab States”. But if the neighbourhood is a clear geographic priority, it
is less clear in which types of contingencies the EU will undertake which type of
action. Whether the “broader neighbourhood”, including Central Asia and the
Gulf, is a priority as well should also be debated. Next to the neighbourhood,
only Iran is singled out as a priority, and the EU has indeed been “at the fore-
front of international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear programme”, as the
Report states. Other conflicts are mentioned in the ESS: “Problems such as those
in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on Euro-
pean interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all
in the Middle East” – whether that implies the EU should actively contribute to
their resolution is not clear at all. Sub-Saharan Africa has been an important
area of focus for ESDP, though the strategy behind it is not always clear; e.g. if
the EU twice intervened in the DRC at the request of the UN, why was the third
request refused? This demonstrates that without strategy, it is impossible to
define what success of an operation means. Other strategic players are becoming
increasingly active, but are mostly unwilling to contribute to crisis-management
on the African continent – what are the EU’s priorities? Securing Europe’s lines
of communication with the world, of which the operation off Somalia is an
example, is a more obvious priority.15
Importantly, the collective security system of the UN, and therefore of the EU,
as its main supporter and with two permanent members of the Security Council
in its ranks, can only be legitimate if it addresses the threats to everyone’s secu-
rity – too much selectivity undermines the system. Even though it cannot always
play a leading role, the EU must therefore also shoulder its share of the respon-
sibility for global peace and security by playing an active role in the Security
Council (notably via its strategic partnerships with the non-EU permanent mem-
bers) and by contributing capabilities to UN(-mandated) crisis management and
peacekeeping operations. Notably if anywhere in the world the threshold to
15. James Rogers, From Suez to Shanghai: The European Union and Eurasian Maritime Security. Oca-
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activate the mechanism of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)16 is reached, the
EU, in view of its support for the principle, and in view of its vital interest in
upholding international law, should contribute. Not mentioned in the ESS, R2P
is included in the Implementation Report – a positive signal.
Finally, the EU must decide the scale of the effort to devote to these priorities.
Quantitatively, ESDP is based on the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, i.e. 60,000
troops, but in the perception this has been overshadowed by the much more
limited battlegroup project. The actual availability of the forces declared cannot
be assessed, as they are not pre-identified and Member States have mostly
declared similar numbers to NATO as well. If all ongoing ESDP, NATO, UN
and national operations in which EU Member States participate are counted,
Europe today deploys more than 80,000 troops, but EU Member States obvi-
ously cannot mobilize 60,000 additional troops for expeditionary operations.
But even the combined ESDP and NATO level of ambition, even if collective
defence is taken into account, still falls far short of the total combined armed
forces at the disposal of the EU-27: 2 million troops. There is as yet no vision
about how many of those Europe really needs.
An EU grand strategy must define Europe’s ambition as a global security actor,
which can then inform a military or civil-military sub-strategy or “white book”.
As Member States have but a single set of forces, the question is not what the
ESDP level of ambition is and what that of NATO: the question is what the EU,
as the political expression of Europe and as a comprehensive foreign policy
actor, wants to contribute as a global security provider, regardless of whether a
specific operation is undertaken under ESDP or NATO (or UN) command. It is
in the EU therefore that Member States logically ought to take the primary polit-
ical decision whether or not to act in a given situation. If their decision entails
military action, the secondary step is to select the organization through which
to act – NATO, ESDP, the UN, the OSCE, an ad hoc coalition – which will
always be a tailored solution, in function of which partners want to go along
and which organization is best suited for the case at hand. It is in the EU as well
that Member States can build more deployable forces, by various forms of coop-
eration and pooling between Europeans, and which will be available for all of
the potential frameworks for operations.
16. Endorsed at the UN Millennium+5 Summit in September 2005, R2P implies that if a State is unable or
unwilling to protect its own population, or is itself the perpetrator of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war
crimes or crimes against humanity, national sovereignty must give way to a responsibility to protect on
the part of the international community. In such cases, the Security Council must mandate intervention, if
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A white book must thus cut across organizational divides and must cover the
full spectrum of operations, including a transparent assessment of what is really
needed for collective defence, also in view of the Lisbon Treaty’s stipulations
about the Solidarity Clause and “mutual defence” – existing plans are too much
of a paper exercise. How many forces should the EU-27 be able to muster for
crisis management and long-term peacekeeping, for which priorities, which
reserves does that require, and what are the needs of collective defence? In all
probability the result will be that Europe does not need 2 million uniforms, but
can use some additional strategic capabilities.35
The Institutions of Grand Strategy
It is not sufficient to have a grand strategy – one must then also apply it. Ulti-
mately, joint action shapes a common strategic culture. Experience with the ESS
shows that this requires a institutional follow-up structure, ensuring that a spe-
cific body is responsible for monitoring implementation, and setting deadlines
for reporting back to the European Council. For lack of it, the ESS, although
omnipresent in the public debate, failed to have sufficient impact on actual pol-
icy-making: officials habitually referred to it when having to explain to various
publics the EU’s role in the world, but did not seem to refer to it very often in
their own work. Most importantly, the remit of a grand strategy must be per-
fectly clear. As it is, the ESS is too often seen as “the Solana paper”, pertaining
only to the CFSP; little sense of ownership seems to exist in the Commission,
certainly outside DG Relex. Furthermore, there is no clear locus for strategic
debate within the institutions. The Political and Security Committee is too much
absorbed by daily business (ongoing operations, the development of concepts,
preparing Council meetings) and the same holds true for the Policy Unit. Draft-
ing the original ESS in 2003 was a specific mandate, which did not automati-
cally endow Solana and his staff with the authority for its follow-up.
At the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the ESS – to be developed into a
complete grand strategy – must be officially designated the guiding document
for all dimensions of EU foreign policy, across the pillars. The High Represent-
ative/Vice-President of the Commission, supported by the External Action Serv-
ice, should be formally entrusted with its implementation and development and
take the lead in the Council and the Political and Security Committee. As the
High Representative will chair the Council when it deals with foreign policy, he/
she will have a much greater impact on agenda-setting, which should allow him/
her to schedule strategic-level debates as required, supported by a strong policy-
planning branch with which the External Action Service should be endowed.
Finally, a systematic strategic review process should be instituted, e.g. every 5
years, with clear follow-up and reporting mechanisms, in order to ensure that
the EU, at the level of Heads of State and Government, regularly assesses and if
necessary amends its grand strategy, which must be a dynamic document. A true
strategic review allows us to identify in which areas the grand strategy has yet
to be translated into sub-strategies, policies and actions, to assess their effective-
ness in areas where it has, and to establish where they overlap and contradict
each other. At the level of sub-strategies too, evaluation and review processes
should be set up. Thus strategic awareness can be institutionalized.37
Conclusion: A New European Project
A grand strategy that translates the values on which the EU’s own social model
is based into a proactive and constructive foreign policy, aimed at concrete
objectives: on that basis, with the right political leadership, the EU can be a
global power. Like other European projects before it – the opening of the bor-
ders, the Euro – this too can be an inspiring project, able to generate the support
of the public. Documents alone do not change the world – even though academ-
ics might sometimes wish otherwise – but it is important to provide a narrative
to policy-makers and the public alike, explaining why Europe must be a global
power and which objectives it must achieve. The choice for “Europe as a
project” requires inspiring projects to pursue.39
Contributors
Dr. Jan Joel ANDERSSON is Programme Director at the Swedish Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, where he has been a Senior Research Fellow since 1999. He
was educated at the United World College of the Adriatic in Duino, Italy and the
universities of Uppsala, Maryland, and California at Berkeley. He is a member
of The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, a former Visiting
Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and has been a staff mem-
ber in a US Senator’s office on Capitol Hill in Washington.
Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP is Director of Egmont’s Security & Global Governance
Programme and visiting professor at the College of Europes in Bruges and at
Ghent University. He is a member of the Executive Academic Board of the Euro-
pean Security and Defence College (ESDC) and co-director for Egmont of the
High Studies in Security and Defence, co-organized with Belgium’s Royal
Defence College.
Brig-Gen (R) Jo COELMONT is a Senior Associate Fellow at Egmont and former
Belgian Permanent Representative to the EU Military Committee.
Prof. Dr. Rik COOLSAET is Professor of International Relations and Chair of the
Department of Political Science at Ghent University. He is a Senior Associate
Fellow at Egmont and a member of the European Commission Expert Group on
Violent Radicalisation (established in 2006). From 2002 to 2009 he served as
Director of Egmont’s Security & Global Governance Programme. He has held
several high-ranking official positions, such as deputy chief of the Cabinet of the
Belgian Minister of Defence (1988-1992) and deputy chief of the Cabinet of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1992-1995).
Dr. Janis A. EMMANOUILIDIS is Senior Policy Analyst at the European Policy Cen-
tre (EPC) in Brussels. Before joining the EPC he was Stavros Costopoulos
Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
(ELIAMEP) (2007-2009), Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Applied Pol-
icy Research (C·A·P) (1999-2007), and Research Fellow at the Institut für
Europäische Politik (IEP) (1995-1997). He has studied international relations
and strategic studies in the UK and economics at the University of Erlangen-
Nuremberg, Germany.
Dr. Giovanni GREVI is a Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security
Studies in Paris. He holds a doctorate in International Relations from the Uni-
versité libre de Bruxelles (ULB), an MSc from the London School of EconomicsTHE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
40
and a DEA from the ULB. He worked at the Forward Studies Unit of the Euro-
pean Commission in 1998 and in 1999 joined the European Policy Centre (EPC)
in Brussels, where he was Associate Director of Studies from 2002 to 2005.
Prof. Dr. Jolyon HOWORTH is Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics at the
University of Bath (UK). He has been a Visiting Professor of Political Science at
Yale since 2002. In 2008-13, he will be Visiting Professor of Political Science and
International Affairs, dividing his teaching between the Political Science Depart-
ment and the International Affairs Council. Previous appointments were at: Uni-
versity of Paris III-Sorbonne-Nouvelle, University of Wisconsin-Madison and
Aston University. He has held Visiting Professorships at Harvard University, the
Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Paris), the University of Washington, Columbia and
New York Universities, as well as a Senior Research Fellowship at the EU Insti-
tute for Security Studies. He is a Senior Research Associate at the Institut
Français des Relations Internationales (Paris), a Fellow of the Royal Society for
the Arts (UK), Chevalier dans l’Ordre des Palmes Académiques (France), and
Member of the Advisory Boards of the European Institute for Public Adminis-
tration (Netherlands), the Centre for the Study of Security and Diplomacy (UK)
and the European Business School (London).
Alexander MATTELAER is a Research Fellow and PhD candidate at the Institute
for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. His research focuses on
the interaction between the political decision-making and military planning of
crisis management operations undertaken by European armed forces. Before
embarking on his PhD, he earned an MA in Contemporary European Politics
from the University of Bath as well as an MA in literature and linguistics from
the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
Dr. Gerrard QUILLE is an Advisor in the Policy Department of the Directorate-
General for External Policies of the Union in the European Parliament.
Thomas RENARD is a Research Fellow at Egmont. Before joining Egmont, he
collaborated with various think tanks in Washington DC, including the James-
town Foundation, the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, and the
Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies. He holds a Master in Interna-
tional Affairs from the George Washington University.
Bert VERSMESSEN, a Belgian diplomat, is the deputy permanent representative of
Belgium to the EU’s Political and Security Committee. Previously he was posted
to Budapest, Damascus and Ottawa and, while in Brussels, was a member of
Belgium’s 2006 OSCE Presidency task force. A Master in Linguistics and aTHE VALUE OF POWER, THE POWER OF VALUES: A CALL FOR AN EU GRAND STRATEGY
41
former Fulbright student, he also holds an MA in European Political Studies
from the College of Europe.
Prof. Dr. Richard WHITMAN is Professor of Politics at the University of Bath
since April 2006. Formerly he was Head of the European Programme and Senior
Fellow, Europe at Chatham House, where he remains an Associate Fellow. Pre-
viously, he was Professor of European Studies at the University of Westminster
where he also served as Director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy
between 2001-2003. In 2009 he was elected chairman of the University Associ-
ation for Contemporary European Studies (UACES).
The members of the group wish to thank James ROGERS, PhD candidate at the
University of Cambridge, and Siobhán GIBNEY, intern at Egmont, for their pre-
cious aid.